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ABSTRACT 
Upon becoming prime-minister of Malaysia in 1981, Mahathir initiated the “Look East” policy.  
This policy looked at Korea and Japan and sought to use these countries as examples. The 
policy was not only meant as an economic measure, but also as a cultural policy to aid the 
poor Malays. This thesis tries to answer the question to what extent the policy was aimed for 
the latter and how this  was to be implemented. Firstly,  it  will  look at Malaysia's  cultural 
background and Mahathir's view on the matter before becoming prime-minister. It focuses 
on his book, the Malay Dilemma, where he stressed the need for Malays to change their  
values. Secondly it will look into the initiation of the “Look East” policy and what it aimed to  
do. Thirdly, it will go into Japan's image and how Mahathir sought to transfer values from 
Japan to Malaysia.  Then, it will  look at the implementation of the policy and how it  was  
executed. Lastly, the conclusion talks about the cultural influence of the “Look East” policy.  
Saying that the policy was not effective in changing the values of the Malays, but did bring  
out a change in direction from looking to the West towards looking to the East.  
KEYWORDS: “Look East” policy, Malaysia, Malays, Change of values, Japan.
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Introduction
After World War II, a great part of the world was left devastated and economically disrupted.  
Countries in Southeast Asia, after the decolonization by European and Japanese forces, were 
left to their own devices. Malaysia, which had been colonized by both England and Japan, also 
struggled with the redevelopment and restructuring of its own economy and government and 
redefining their own identity. They were helped by the British for a short period after with 
rebuilding their economy, but Britain was criticized  for going after Malaysia's primary resources 
in order to rebuild their own economy. After Britain withdrew from Malaysia, the Malays were 
left to govern the country. While most of the economic power was left in the hands of the 
Chinese, the Malays were in control  in the political  area.  This divided the country into two 
groups where the Malays held the political power, but were mostly poor, while the Chinese had 
economic  power,  but  enjoyed less  political  power.  A  few years  after  the independence of  
Malaysia, ethnic riots in 1969 between these two groups caused many deaths and casualties. 
Because of such an incident where the racial problems became undeniable, the government 
tried to secure the issue by implementing the NEP (New Economic Policy). This was meant to 
decrease the poverty of the Malays and in turn decrease the gap between the two groups.  
Datuk Seri Mahathir bin Mohammad, who became prime-minister of Malaysia in 1981, was 
known  to  be  a  Malay  nationalist  after  writing  his  book;  The  Malay  Dilemma  in  1970.  He 
struggled  to  find  a  way  for  Malaysia  to  become a  NIC  (Newly  Industrialized  Country)  and 
focused mainly on the development of the poor Malays. One of the first policies he initiated  
was the “Look East” policy. This “Look East” policy was however vague and undefined, but 
meant to use Japan and Korea as examples for Malaysia. How this was to be executed, was not  
made out in strict rules and regulations, but stated that Malaysia would need to learn from 
Korean and Japanese work ethics and values. Malaysians were to be send to Japanese schools 
to learn their language, history and culture. Mahathir already stressed in his 'Malay Dilemma'  
that he desired a change of values from the Malays. Besides the cultural context of the policy, it  
also promoted technology transfer, attracting FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and constructing 
joint-ventures with Japan and Korea to promote import substitution. 
Even though much has already been written about Malaysia from an ethnic perspective, looking 
at the conflicts between the indigenous people from Malaysia and the Chinese-Malay groups, 
when the  “Look  East”  policy  is  discussed,  it  is  often  viewed as  economically  successful  or  
unsuccessful.  However, Mahathir's  aim was not just  economic as a high emphasis  was also 
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placed on the cultural aspect. Therefore the question remains;  What did Mahathir aim to do 
with the “Look East” policy on a cultural level? Furthermore, to what extent did the cultural aim 
of Mahathir succeed in changing the values of the Malays? 
There are many scholars who discuss the ethnic and racial problems in Malaysia, but have left 
out the “Look East” policy or only briefly touch upon the topic. (See Hirschman 1983, 1987;  
Chung 1987; Bunnell 2002; Khoo 2003) Some scholars have also talked about the “Look East” 
policy  in  more  detail,  but  focus  more  on  the  influence  of  Japan  in  Malaysia  and  less  on 
Mahathir's cultural side of the “Look East” policy.  (See Jomo 1985, 1994; Furuoka 2007) Often 
when scholars discuss the two main joint-ventures  with Japan,  which were projects  of  the 
HICOM (Heavy Industries Corporations of Malaysia) and part of the “Look East” policy, the focus 
lies on its economic result. (See Machado 1990; Natsuda et al 2013) However, Mahathir desired 
for the  Bumiputra (The indigenous people of Malaysia) to be able to challenge the Chinese 
economic  hegemony  in  Malaysia,  according  to  the  book;  The  Malay  Dilemma.  Thus  both 
projects were influenced by his cultural aim of the policy. Therefore this thesis will go more in  
depth about the social-political context of the “Look East” policy looking closely at Mahathir's 
cultural aim and if he was successful in changing the values of the Malays.
The first  chapter is  about  Mahathir's  background and motivation before he became prime-
minister.  This  chapter  discusses  the  ethnic  riots,  The  Malay  Dilemma  and  the  NEP,  all  
forebodings of the kind of prime-minister Mahathir was to become and the reason behind the  
“Look East” policy. The second chapter discusses the “Look East” policy itself. This chapter goes  
into  the  definition  of  the  policy  and  its  cultural  aim.  Furthermore,  it  discusses  the 
implementation of the HICOM, technology transfer and the usage of the Islam to support the 
“Look  East”  policy.  The  third  chapter  talks  about  Japan's  image  during  the  time  Mahathir 
became prime-minister  and how this  affected Mahathir's  choice  to  look  east.  This  chapter  
discusses the FDI of Japan in Malaysia, the image of hard-working Japanese employees and the 
changing of Malay values into Japanese values. The fourth chapter is about the implementation 
of the “Look East” policy in Malaysia. Discussing the Malaysian sogoshoshas (Japanese trading 
companies), the joint-ventures and the education program of the “Look East” policy, whether 
or not these projects helped change the values of the Malaysians. Finally the conclusion will talk 
about the choices Mahathir made according to his idealism to support the Malays and how 
effective this  seemed to be.  Arguing that  the cultural  aim of  the policy  was unlikely to be 
achieved  from  the  beginning,  but  that  the  Malays  did  change  from  a  traditional  Western 
orientation to an Eastern one.
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Mahathir before becoming prime-minister
“He left medicine for politics only to practice politics as medicine”
(Khoo 2003: 10).
To understand Mahathir’s “Look East” policy it is important to look at certain events and state 
interventions prior to the initiation of this policy. Before Mahathir became prime-minister in  
1981, he was already an infamous politician and was dubbed an Ultra-Malay. His ideas were not  
only shaped by his own identity, but also by external causes. The ethnic riots that triggered the 
making of the NEP are often seen as the beginning of the segregation between the two major  
ethnic groups, however it has been argued by scholars and Mahathir himself that the ethnic 
discrimination was already in play before the ethnic riots in 1969. A brief look into Malaysia’s  
history from the 1960’s to the 1980’s will show the motivation behind Mahathir’s “Look East” 
policy. 
Mahathir was born in 1925 and grew up in a the capital of Kedah, Alor Setar, the same  
birthplace as Malaysia's first prime minister; Tunku Abdul Rahman. Before Mahathir became 
prime-minister he was a doctor of a private clinic. Mahathir therefore was not a mainstream 
Malay, since most Malays at that time were concentrated in rural areas and often worked in the 
agricultural sector. 
Riots of 1969
After the independence of Malaysia in 1957 from the British colonial rule, Malaysia struggled 
with the political implications of a multi-ethnic populated country. The Malays only held a slight  
majority in the Malaysian population with 55%, whereas the Chinese population was a close 
second with 34%.1 However, in general it was thought that these ethnic groups would not clash 
with each other as it had only occurred once before during the second world war. This was  
caused by an overlay of Chinese communist that were against the Japanese regime, whereas 
the Malays were not as anti-Japanese as the Chinese. After the Japanese left, it was thought 
that the problem between the ethnic groups would slowly disappear again. Thus when in 1969 
riots between these two ethnic groups occurred in Kuala Lumpur, it shocked the whole nation.  
This time the clash was not initiated by the Chinese, but by the Malays who believed that their  
1 Population and Housing Census, Malaysia, in 1970
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economic problems weren't addressed sufficiently by the government. It  was rather unclear 
what the exact reasons behind the riots were and if the problems were shallow or deeply-
seated in Malaysia. The main focus was on the poor Malays versus the wealthy Chinese and 
how the  government  had  failed  to  deal  with  the  increasing  economic  gap  between these 
groups. 
Many believe,  including Mahathir,  that  the cause for  these ethnic  riots  stemmed from the 
British rule, where they already segregated the ethnic groups by providing these groups with 
different jobs. Malays were often given government jobs as part of the protection the British  
offered  to  the  indigenous  people  of  Malaysia,  while  Chinese  and  Indians  were  favored  in 
competitive market positions. Many Malays were thus able to stay in rural areas,  whereas the 
Chinese and  Indians  needed to  find  fortune  in  the  cities  (Milne and  Mauzy  1990:10).  This  
divided the Malays and non-Malays also between rural and urban areas. The main problem was 
that after the British left, these divisions did not go away. The British left the Malays in charge 
of leading the country, thus the Malays mainly remained in government positions or stayed in 
the rural areas and the Chinese and Indians stayed mostly at market positions in urban areas.  
Thus the ethnic riots were caused by the rural and urban separation and racial job preference in  
certain areas,  which was promoted by the British empire, and lead to clashes between the 
ethnic  groups.  Further  showing  that  these  ethnic  differences  had  become  an  undeniable 
problem in Malaysia and that they had not been that accepting of a multi-ethnic society as 
much as they believed. A new plan was necessary to make sure such riots and the increasing 
instability among the population were to be put under control before it would escalate further. 
The Malay Dilemma
Mahathir bin Mohamad, before he became prime-minister in 1981 responded to the increased 
discrimination that the people became more aware of during the ethnic riots, by writing the 
controversial book; “The Malay Dilemma”. This book was written just a year after the riots and 
stressed the need for state intervention to help the indigenous people of Malaysia. He blames 
the government for inadequate action. 
“Secure in its absolute majority in Parliament, it was openly contemptuous of criticism. 
Policies were made which completely ignored public opinion. Typical of this was the 
decision to use Government funds to settle the cost of of a private summons case when 
a Minister sued an opposition MP for slander” (Mahathir 1970:10-11).
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However,  in  1998 conflicts  between Mahathir  and Anwar  Ibrahim,  his  deputy minister  and 
finance minister, reached a peak when Ibrahim was arrested for corruption and sodomy. Anwar 
Ibrahim was proclaimed to be a more liberal thinker and did not always think the same way as 
Mahathir  who  was  more  known  for  being  conservative  and  authoritarian.  To  what  extent 
Mahathir was involved in the arrest is not known, but there were Malays who believed that it 
was a conspiracy from the government to deny Ibrahim the option of succeeding Mahathir as  
prime-minister.  Suggesting  that  the  critique  he  had  for  the  government  at  that  time,  was 
something  he  was  guilty  of  himself.  After  criticizing  the  government,  Mahathir  goes  on  to 
explain why the Malays needed help. He argues that there are two main factors that caused the 
Malays  to  be  behind  the  Chinese  in  an  economic  perspective,  which  are  hereditary  and 
environmental. 
“The observation that only the fittest would survive did not apply, for the abundance of 
food supported the existence of even the weakest” (Mahathir 1970:21).
Mahathir looks at the geographical conditions to argue that the Malays did not have a necessity 
to aim towards higher education, whereas he mentions that Chinese were always raised with 
the idea to become business man and to put education high on their list. This chapter shows 
that Mahathir was a fervent believer of the theory that the fittest will survive and in a way 
seems hypocritical  in his protection of the Malays.  He also argues that races have different 
characteristics, saying that Malays are easy going and tolerant (Mahathir 1970:85). However,  
believing  that  these  can  be  changed  over  time  (Mahathir  1970:96).  Often  saying  that  the 
Malays  are  economically  and  educationally  backward,  and  retarding  their  own  process  by 
staying in rural areas and also believing that urbanization is the key to development (Mahathir 
1970:79). In 1970 it was the case that an amount of 76% of the population was still living in 
rural  areas,  with  most  of  the  rural  population  being  Malays  (Saari,  Dietzenbacher  and Los 
2014:23). A situation that Mahathir was not pleased about.
He also mentions the Islamization of Malaysian as an argument as to why this caused 
more separation between the Malays and the Chinese: 
“The adoption of Islam as the religion of the Malays also resulted in the development of 
a permanent barrier against further changes in religion. Hitherto, Malays had felt free to 
marry outside their religion.  Now Islam forbade such marriage except when certain  
conditions were met” (Mahathir 1970:23).
And since it was extremely rare for Chinese to be Muslim, interracial marriages were almost 
non-existent. Even though Mahathir states that the Islam is making assimilation more difficult 
between the ethnic groups, he still thought it necessary in 1984 to promote the Islam during his  
tenure before being re-elected as prime-minister. Suggesting he was not looking for a method 
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to promote assimilation between the ethnic groups, but was looking for a way to make the 
Malays able to compete against the Chinese. 
Afterward, Mahathir compares the native American Indians with the indigenous people from 
Malaysia, saying they have similarities in the way they are treated. They are both economically 
and socially discriminated against, but not by the law. Furthermore the Native Americans are 
provided with special privileges, but don’t seem to use the money provided by the government 
for  long-term commitment to improve their  standing with U.S.  citizens.  Instead they spent 
money  to  buy  electronics  and  commercial  goods,  instant  gratification  goods.  Therefore 
Mahathir believes that it will be the same case for the Malays, if they are provided with money 
from the government, they will spend it on immediate satisfactory goods instead of looking at  
long-term improvement. However, Mahathir says that, not providing the Malays with some sort 
of economic help will also result in more segregation between the races, as he compares that  
situation with the black community in the U.S. Less jobs are available for the black community  
and the white people tend to move away from a neighborhood with black people in it. Thus 
keeping the discrimination alive and increasing it by making it ‘normal’ to discriminate, because 
everyone is doing it.
However, the difference between these groups is of course the fact that they had to fight hard  
to be involved with their countries' politics. It wasn't until the 1870s that the law in the United 
States provided the opportunity for the black community to be able to vote. This was not the 
case  for  the  Malays  which  were  instead  favored  to  be  involved  in  politics  and  who 
discriminated against Chinese for those positions. Mahathir is thus downplaying the amount of  
power the Malays held in his famed book. Malays held most of the governmental positions and 
thus were able to control the Chinese economy if they wanted to. More so, even if the Chinese 
were an economic power in Malaysia,  it  had still  been impossible for a Chinese to become  
prime-minister of Malaysia, which shows the discrimination against the Chinese in the political  
area. So just as Mahathir blames the Chinese of cryonistic behavior, the Malays acted the same  
way with governmental  positions.  Mahathir  and other Malays were afraid that the Chinese 
would take over the political scene and would leave the Malays in an underpowered position. 
This was almost the case for Singapore. In Singapore ethnic riots also occurred and were the 
reason  that  in  1965  it  was  separated  from  Malaysia.  Singapore  has  a  different  ethnic 
distribution from the Malaysian one, where the majority is Chinese with a percentage of 74% 
and the Malays with  only 13% and the remaining percentages filled by Indians and other races. 
When Malaysia was focused on clearing laws to benefit the Malays, Singapore, with a majority  
of Chinese was not in favor of these decisions. Thus in 1965 Malaysia decided unanimously to 
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separate  from  Singapore.  Perhaps  even  more  reason  for  Mahathir  to  fear  that  if  the 
government did not take considerate action than it  would become like Singapore were the 
Chinese would be the one to be in charge, leaving the Malays as a minority unable to recover 
from their poverty.
 
Furthermore,  most of  the Chinese were immigrants  and it  was  therefore  very difficult  and 
unlikely for them to own land. Most immigrants are offered few options in what sector they can 
work  in  and this  was no different  for  the Chinese.  Therefore  it  is  no coincidence that  the  
Chinese were mainly situated in urban areas and would look for jobs in the market sector. To 
solve  the  problem  of  discrimination  by  hiring,  the  Malays  needed  to  gain  the  necessary 
experience for the jobs that the non-Malays were mainly working in. Therefore the ‘protection’ 
of  the  Malays  would  be  aimed  at  providing;  the  necessary  experience  and  the  necessary 
motivation. The first could be provided with economical aid for better education in rural areas. 
However the second goal would be more difficult to realize. If the Malays remain ‘lazy’ then a  
different technique should be considered. 
In  “The Malay Dilemma” Mahathir  mainly  focuses  on two different  reasons  as  to  why the 
Malays are 'behind'. He mentions both hereditary aspects and the type of values that are the 
reasons behind Malaysian 'backwardness'. Hereditary aspects as to why the Malays are 'behind'  
would be impossible to try and change in a lifetime, but he also talks about the Malay's values 
that are keeping them behind and according to him those values can be changed. Thus it seems 
likely that Mahathir's choices regarding the NEP and other policies were focused on changing 
the values of the Malays into something that would be more productive.
Mahathir himself  comes from a Malay background who became a successful  doctor. 
Therefore he knew how difficult it was for a Malay to reach a certain level and how the poor  
were trying to handle themselves. It also makes it easier to understand why he believes it's  
mainly the cause of the 'wrong' values as he had been able to become a successful Malay. This  
book had dubbed Mahathir to be an Ultra-Malay. Saying that the  Bumiputra were lazy and 
lacked ambition. According to Yusof M. Saari, Erik Dietzenbacher and Bart Los (2014) , there are 
three simple reasons for the difference in income between the Chinese and the Malays: 
“The Chinese are doing much better  in this  respect,  they have substantially  higher  
payments per hour, work more hours per week and their share of economically inactive 
members is relatively low so that the earned income is shared by a relatively smaller  
number of people. This explains why the per capita income of rural Chinese households 
is much larger than that of the Malay” (Saari, Dietzenbacher and Los 2014:17).  
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How much of the difference between the groups is because of the 'wrong' values in unclear. It 
could be that the Malays themselves are indeed lazy, but it could also be that simply the image 
of Malays being lazy was reason to discriminate against them in the work field. 
The Challenge
The Malay Dilemma was not the only book he wrote before becoming prime-minister. In 1976 
he wrote The Challenge, which focused more on the East versus the West, instead of the Malay  
versus the Chinese. Thus looking further away to determine 'the enemy'. After his first book got  
banned,  Mahathir  continued  to  look  for  solutions  to  his  dilemma and  shifted  more  to  an 
external source. Whether this was a political choice to lessen the strong opinions expressed in 
the Malay Dilemma or his sincere opinion is of course only speculation. 
 “The  Malay  Dilemma  identified  the  kinds  of  attributes  and  values  --  for  example,  
fatalism, passivity, lack of appreciation of time, money and property -- that the Malays 
had to discard. The Challenge tried to specify the critical elements of a new system of 
values which the Malays should adopt” (Khoo 1995:36).  
In the Malay Dilemma, the focus lies on the division between the Chinese and the Malays,  
whereas The Challenge, written in 1976, is more interested in the division between Extremist 
Muslim Malays and Non-extremist Muslim Malays.  In The Challenge, the Chinese are rarely  
mentioned and the book is more interested in the Muslim world and the West versus the East.  
Thus extending the scope from Malaysia in The Malay Dilemma, to the global  scope in The 
Challenge. The focus shifts from an internal problem to an external problem. Furthermore, The 
Challenge also discusses that the West is declining and that this is effecting the East as well.  
Saying that the values of the West are deteriorating and that that is why Malaysia should stop 
looking at the West. Otherwise, Malaysia will suffer from value contamination as mentioned by 
Khoo (1995:45).
NEP - New Economic Policy
In 1971, which was two years after the riots and one year after the controversial book was  
written by Mahathir, the NEP (New Economic Policy) was created by the then Prime-Minister 
Tun Abdul Razak. Him and others believed that the the Malays’ economic grievances had not 
been sufficiently addressed (Milne and Mauzy 1999:21).  The NEP was meant as a state led 
policy to help raise the economic share of the indigenous people of Malaysia, also referred to as 
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the  bumiputra.  They set a target of 30%  bumiputra participation and ownership. Which was 
only 2% in 1970 (Athukorala and Menon 1996:31). This was thought to elevate the bumiputra’s 
economic standing towards a more equally divided share of the economy in Malaysia. This in  
turn  would  decrease  the  gap  between  the  different  ethnic  groups  and  lead  to  a  more 
harmonious country. Most notable about the policy was this:
“Economic imbalances among the races were to be reduced and eventually eliminated, 
and race was no longer to be identified with economic function” (Milne and Mauzy 
1999:51).
The policy suggested that the NEP would address all poverty groups and increase their standing 
within society, but because of the 30%  bumiputra ownership target,  many claimed it aimed 
solely at Malays and would disregard other ethnic groups that were suffering from poverty. It  
would also lead to problems during the initiation as it would cause tensions between the ethnic 
groups. As stated by Mauzy and Milne (1999) : 
“A degree of separation actually contributed to ethnic harmony. One of the dangers of  
“modernization” is that it may bring different ethic groups closer to each other under 
competitive conditions” (Milne and Mauzy 1999:12). 
The reasons why it hadn’t been problematic before was because the way the jobs were divided 
in Malaysia by the British did not promote competition between the ethnic groups as everyone 
had a certain position in the economy. However, the primarily Malay containing government, 
tried to address the problem of the poor and inexperienced Malays, which were the majority of  
Malaysia, and put them in the competitive world of the Chinese. Furthermore, the problem of  
poverty mainly resided within the Malays and some saw the aid that was provided for them as 
an elitarian system where the Malays were favored by the government and the groups that 
weren't  addressed  emphasized  that  the  existing  rights  of  the  non-Malays  needed  to  be 
preserved.
“The NEP was intended to help the poorer Malays, not only by making their lot better in 
their  existing situation,  but also by “leapfrogging” them from the traditional  to the  
modern sectors of the economy” (Milne and Mauzy 1999:52). 
The  theory  behind  the  NEP  mainly  stemmed  from  the  idea  that  the  poverty  among  the  
bumiputra was caused by the lack of opportunities. As Charles Hirschman (1970) concludes in 
his research that access to opportunity structures is indeed an important factor to consider as a 
reason for the ethnic inequality in Malaysia. He says that Malays are preferred in government 
hiring,  whereas  Chinese  are  preferred  in  the  private  sector.  Chinese  often  have  more 
opportunities in the private sector, because family ties and close friends allow them to be hired  
easier then non-Chinese. These hypotheses support the ideas that the Malaysian government 
had when they initiated the NEP, supporting that there is indeed an opportunity lack for the  
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bumiputra. Therefore the government decided to provide economic aid to remove the lack of 
opportunities and thus gradually decrease the gap between the bumiputra and the non-malays. 
Resulting  in  privileged  access  for  Malays  in  business  ownership  and  entrepreneurship  and 
economic aid to the admission of public universities. 
 However, it remains unclear if the NEP helped to decrease the gap or if it gave the bumiputra a 
‘subsidy mentality’  that  possibly increased the gap.  As  was evident in The Malay Dilemma, 
Mahathir does not completely agree with this theory as he also argues that the bumiputra are 
lacking the motivation and therefore would not benefit from the opportunity, because it would 
not lead the Malays to success. As Machado says about Mahathir: 
“he asserted that rural Malays lacked sufficient individual enterprise, independence or 
competitive  ability  and  stressed  that  effecting  changes  in  bumiputra values  and  
behavior was essential to Malaysian development” (Machado 1990:508). 
Mahathir believed that providing the Malays with opportunities was not sufficient enough to 
eradicate the inequality, as they needed to understand that the opportunities were meant to 
help them to compete against the Chinese and not against other Malays.  
“Mahathir  was also disappointed  with  what  he  took  to  be inadequate progress  in  
meeting  NEP goals.  By  1980,  it  was  clear  that  the  1990  target of  30  percent  
Bumiputera  ownership  and  control  in  the  corporate  sector  was not  going  to  be 
met” (Machado 1990:509).
Mahathir was interested in a different way of solving his ‘Malay Dilemma’ and it is thus not 
unexpected  that  Mahathir  dismissed  the  NEP  in  1990,  changing  it  to  the  NDP  (New 
development plan).  While still  keeping many of the aspects from the NEP, it was clear that 
Mahathir sought to apply certain changes to it according to his believes on the matter. The 
focus  shifted  from government  sponsored education  towards  entrepreneurship,  managerial 
expertise  and  skills  development  within  the  Malay  community  (Athukorala  and  Menon 
1999:1124). Which are closely related to the goals of the “Look East” policy where he uses 
Japan and Korea as examples for the expertise and skills.
After the riots in 1969, the economic distribution in Malaysia was shown to be unequal and 
needed political action. The NEP put the emphasis on the problem of opportunity as the reason 
why the gap between the Chinese and Malays existed. However, Mahathir did not fully agree 
with this believe as he asserted in his Malay Dilemma, that he was convinced that the Malays  
lacked the ambition and the necessary values that would make them able to compete with the 
Chinese. Thus when he became prime-minister of Malaysia, changing the values of the Malays 
was on top of his list. 
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The “Look East” policy
In 2002 Mahathir held a speech in Japan for the 20th anniversary of the “Look East” policy,  
where he talks about the reason behind the implementation and what it was meant to emulate 
in his own words: 
“Malaysia identified what we believed to be the factors which contributed towards  
Japan's  success.  They  are  the  patriotism,  discipline,  good  work  ethics,  competent  
management system and above all the close cooperation between the Government and 
the private sector. And so we tried to adopt these practices and instil these cultures in 
our people. And everyone now acknowledges that Malaysia has made better progress 
than most  other  developing countries.  The fastest  pace of  Malaysia's  progress  and  
development took place in the last two decades coinciding with Malaysia's Look East  
policy” (Mahathir 2002)
In 1981 Mahathir became prime-minister and took the seat for a total of 22 years, making him 
the longest serving prime-minister of Malaysia, finally leaving office in 2003. He Launched many 
innovative  policies  and  put  great  effort  to  enhance Malaysia’s  economic  and technological  
standing world wide in order for Malaysia to become a NIC (Newly Industrialized Country).  
Mahathir was seen by many as the most influential man in Malaysian politics and he has been  
credited  with  putting  Malaysia  on  the  world  map.  But  on  the  contrast  he  has  also  been  
criticized for being cryonistic, authoritarian, and hypocritical. 
The policy was aimed to look at the two leading Asian countries Japan and Korea, that had 
recovered greatly after World War II. Mahathir saw Japan and Korea as the best examples to 
follow to  become an  economic  and technological  advanced  nation  that  would  leave  other 
South-East countries behind in development. However, Mahathir did not only seek to gain from 
technology transfer, but wanted Malays to learn from Japanese work ethics and learn Japanese  
managerial skills. Furthermore, the Malays that went to Japan were also pushed to learn the 
Japanese language, history and culture. 
“In a memorandum to senior government officials, Mahathir explained that the “Look 
East” policy meant “emulating the rapidly developing countries of the East in an effort 
to develop Malaysia. Matters deserving attention were diligence and discipline in work, 
loyalty to the nation and to the enterprise or business where one is employed, the  
priority  of  group  over  individual  interests  and  emphasis  on  productivity”  (Khoo  
1995:13).
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However, how the policy was to be implemented remained vague and thus it becomes difficult  
to attribute certain successes or losses to the policy. There were no targets, deadlines or other 
information  that  would  be  able  to  mark  the  progress  of  the  “Look  East”  policy.  Mahathir 
seemed to use the policy more as an inspiration or a slogan to change Malay values into hard 
working  and  diligent  values.  There  was  also  no  official  report  of  the  policy,  but  merely  a  
memorandum to senior officials,  which made it  difficult to fully understand the goal  of the 
policy.
Looking East versus looking West
With a mostly steady rise in GDP (Growth Domestic Product) (except during the asian economic  
crisis in 1995) it is one of the countries that was part of the Worldbank's East Asian miracles 
(Worldbank 1993).  With a greater shift towards industrialization and urbanization, Mahathir 
proved to be effective in bringing Malaysia closer to become a NIC.
Interestingly, one of the first policies he initiated was the “Look East” policy. With such a 
title, it was partly seen as a rejection of the West. Which reflects his opinion in his book “The 
Challenge” about his believe that Western values are deteriorating. In par with this look East 
policy, Mahathir created a “Buy British Last” policy, that said to buy non-British products in 
favor  of  British  products,  unless  these  were  not  available  or  higher  priced.  Thus  publicly 
showing the change of direction in international politics. Though it is suggested that the policy 
was mainly a reaction to the British government upon their increase of the university fee for 
students from Malaysia (Furuoka 2007:507) and the London Stock Exchange's hostile reception 
to a Malaysian take-over of a British company (Khoo 1995:55), the Buy British Last policy made 
a strong statement. It showed his interest in being independent from the West and to Look East 
for a new leader under which Malaysia could develop. The idea that this was more used as a 
statement that an actual policy is clear when the Buy British last policy was already withdrawn 
in  1983,  only  two  years  after  the  initiation.  The  relation  between  Margaret  Thatcher  and 
Mahathir  had  become strong  and  made the  policy  and possible  grudges  between the two 
countries disappear. 
As the Buy British last policy was meant to prefer non-British products, the Look East 
policy stressed that it wasn't meant as buying only Eastern products.  It was meant to look at 
the East as an example and not to become dependent on it. This showed a new direction in  
international politics that was much more Asian oriented and less dependent on the West. The 
policy was a shift from the West as a traditional role model, towards a new modern role model,  
the East. 
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Transfer of values
Mahathir tried to find a different reason for the gap between the ethnic groups and looked at 
what  the  bumiputra were  lacking;  a  reason  to  work  harder.  For  if  they  had  the  same 
opportunities then why didn’t they become as successful as the Chinese in the private sector? 
The NEP was criticized to cause a subsidy mentality and to be unsuccessful in decreasing the 
gap between the ethnic groups. Mahathir believed that it was their lack of motivation that  
caused the  Malays  to  be poor  and unsuccessful.  Therefore  the Look  East  policy  is  part  of  
Mahathir’s ideal of a hard-working and nationalistic Malay workforce, that would be able to 
lead the country not only politically, but also economically.
Under  these  motivations,  it  was  promoted  to  send  Malaysian  students  to  Japan  and  for 
prestigious  teachers from Japan to come to Malaysia.  Both actions  were subsidized by the 
Malaysia government and also partly by the Japanese government. 
“Setting Japan as the role model  for  Malaysia,  Mahathir  encouraged Malaysians  to  
learn from Japanese work ethics and values. To aid the “transfer of values” from Japan,  
the Malaysian government launched a new educational  program giving scholarships  
to hundreds of talented young Malaysians to study at and earn degrees from Japanese 
universities” (Furuoka 2007:508-509)
This idea of taking over Japanese work ethics was by no means a democratized idea, but was  
Mahathir’s solution to the dilemma he wrote about in 1970. He was interested in changing the 
outdated values of the Malays and needed to have an example to give to the Malays to follow.  
His solution was thus to look East, at Korea and Japan. Of all the values of the Japanese, in an 
interview with Mahathir, it seems the one he is most interested in is 'shame':
“When people have no sense of shame, they will do shoddy work. If you have a sense of 
shame, you will try to work hard, and you will succeed. When you don’t have shame, 
your mind becomes corrupted and you won’t have discipline. This type of people will  
never succeed. We need a new value system. It doesn’t change you. You are still  a  
Malay, Chinese or Indian. But the value system must be such that it encourages you, or 
even forces you to do well” (Rahim et al 2009).
Indirectly suggesting that it is this value, shame, that the Malays are lacking and causing the 
Malays to be unmotivated and undisciplined.
However, it seems strange to expect such a policy to work without prior thought about 
the people of  Malaysia themselves.  Even if  Japan had been proven to be a very successful  
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country due to its hard-working and nationalistic people, there was no reason to believe that 
these values could be transferred to people from another nation, simply by having them study 
the country. Seeing how people are behaving in other countries seem unlikely as an effective  
means to change the values of a people. If it would be successful, it seems more likely that the 
Chinese in Malaysia would have been able to reshape Malays values, but in all those years that 
they have lived together, not much of the values of the Chinese has turned to the Malays. Even 
when Mahathir talks about the hard-working Chinese in his “Malay dilemma” he ignores their 
potential as an example. Whether it was because of the on going friction between the two 
ethnic groups or Mahathir's personal attitude towards the Chinese is left in the dark.2 
Using the Islam
In Malaysia the Islam plays a big role in society. Since almost all Malays are Muslim, it divides 
the Malays from the non-Malays and the believers from the non-believers. Japan is however 
not  Islamitic  and  does  not  have  a  monotheistic  believe.  While  many  in  Japan  believe  in 
Shintoism and Buddhism, these religions are not very comparable to the Islam. This caused 
some critique from Muslims in Malaysia with regard to the “Look East” policy:
“Reacting to criticism of  the Malaysian 'Look East'  policy's  emphasis  on supposedly  
Japanese  work  ethics,  and  understandably  reluctant  to  claim  a  common  cultural  
heritage once this had been claimed to be Confucian, the Mahathir administration had 
instead been obliged to emphasize  that  the work ethics being  promoted were not  
contradictory to, but rather consistent with, Islam” (Jomo 1994:4).
further stating that this begs the question why the Mahathir administration bothered to 'look 
East' in the first place if they could have used the Islam to change the values of the Malays.  
Perhaps then not surprisingly, when there was a resurgence in the Islam in 1984, Mahathir 
chose to promote his  political  party;  UMNO, as a Islam oriented party.  The reason for this 
promotion was that one of the Islam oriented parties, the PAS, became more popular. They 
pitted themselves against the UMNO and accused the UMNO from being less Muslim as they 
were. 
“PAS accused the UMNO-led government of not doing enough to establish an Islamic  
state  and  that  UMNO  members  were  Kafirs  or  infidels  -  an  extremely  serious  an  
emotional charge to be leveled at a fellow Muslim” (Chung 1987:47-48). 
2  When Mahathir choose to Look East at Japan, it could have been an ill example for the Chinese, who were anti-
Japanese during the war and in general suffered immense losses during that period. 
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Mahathir  could have argued that  the government should be free of  religion and therefore 
including the non-Malays in his politics. Instead, he opted to argue that his party was more 
Muslim  than  the  PAS  and  thus  winning  the  Muslim  votes.  However  unfortunate  for  the 
excluded Chinese and Indians. When this battle for Islamization occurred, Mahathir could have 
chosen to focus on this aspect for his political party, not solely for the purpose of getting more 
votes for the election that was soon to be held, but to use Islamization as a tool for his own  
goals. If  the “Look East” policy didn’t work to bring out the change of values that Mahathir 
wanted to  see  in  the Malays,  then perhaps  he could  use  the  Islam as  a  means  to  inspire  
nationalism and for the Malays to work harder to achieve better education and jobs. However, 
if  this  was the case then it  seems logical  that he wanted to show the Malays  that he was 
supporting the Islamization that was occurring even if it meant a division between the Malays 
and non-Malays.  Thus  showing that  getting  the  majority  votes  from the Malays  was  more 
important than to find a means to bring the Malays and the non-Malays closer together. If this 
was just a political decision to keep his seat or a personal decision to showcase his favoritism 
towards Malays is not completely clear. Even though this could have meant a re-emergence of  
the 1969 ethnic riots,  the non-Malays seemed to accept this increasing aim towards Malay  
favoritism. 
The  “Look  East”  policy  was  also  intertwined  with  Mahathir’s  heavy  industry  policy  where 
Mahathir  would  look  for  joint-ventures  between  Japanese  and  Malaysian  companies  to 
replicate the idea of the sogoshoshas. Thus two of the big joint-ventures, the steel mill factory 
and the Proton project are often mentioned to be a result of the “Look East” policy. The policy 
also emphasized the need for more FDI (Foreign Direct Investment)  as it was thought it would 
provide more jobs and more importantly transfer technology to Malaysia. However, Malaysia 
was already enjoying much FDI from Japan even before the initiation of the Look East policy.  
The “Look East” policy seemed to be free of racial preference and aimed at taking an example  
from  two  successful  countries  from  the  East.  Learning  from  their  quick  and  successful  
development after World War II, the idea was that this would lead Malaysia to become a NIC.  
However,  the  emphasis  on  the  work  ethics  and  values  of  Korea  and  more  notably  Japan, 
seemed to underline a different aim. One where race and ethnicity were the main focus and 
showed Mahathir's ambition to solve his Malay dilemma by focusing especially on changing the 
Malay values. Mahathir even used the Islam to promote the change of values even though  
Japan and Korea have no comparable religion. However, this meant a disregard for the other 
ethnic groups that weren't Muslim and did not seem to gain much benefits from the “Look 
East” policy.  
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Japan’s role and image in the 80’s
After the second world war, Japan was psychologically and economically devastated. The US 
put  preemptive  sanctions  on  Japan  to limit  its  possibility  to  regain  its  military  strength  by  
adding article 9 to the Japanese constitution. This was seen as a way of demilitarizing Japan and 
securing a possible future threat. Thus, without focusing on rebuilding military power, Japan 
had all the time and money to focus solely on fixing the economy of Japan. However, due to the 
cold war the US demanded aid from Japan and Japan was able to support the U.S.  with a 
substantial amount of money but could not provide sufficient military aid. Japan learned from 
this mistake and realized the need to support the U.S. with army forces. These years before 
they regained some of their military power greatly increased the economic power of Japan and 
Japan quickly  became the second largest  economy in  the 80’s.  With few natural  resources 
Japan imported these from neighboring countries and Japan’s export oriented products were 
mainly high industrial ones. This changed Japan’s image from a warring country to the image of  
a highly industrialized country and leading country of the East. 
After the WWII and when Japan was doing better economically there came the time 
that Japan was pushed towards apologizing and aiding the south-east Asian countries it left so  
devastated. During the rebuilding of these countries there came talk of an East-Asian sphere 
that Japan would be leading. Mahathir suggested in the 1990’s the construction of the EAEC 
(East Asian Economic Caucus) where Japan would be chosen as the leading country. However,  
Japan declined because the US was against it and Japan was still heavily influenced by the US 
regarding international relations after the events of the cold war.
Furthermore there was talk of the flying geese pattern that describes the technology transfer 
through  FDI  and  exports  from  Japan  (See  Akamatsu  1962).  Japanese  high  technological 
factories that would be situated in south-east Asian countries would spread the technology of 
that factory locally whereby the locals would be able to reproduce said technology.
Since Japan had been able to successfully chase the West away from the East and thus 
helped with gaining independence in most South-East Asian countries, Japan was seen as strong 
and  capable  of  leading.  However,  Japan  had  been  very  aggressive  towards  most  Asian 
countries,  which  had  suffered  great  losses  during  the  second world  war.  Therefore  it  was 
strange  that  Malaysia  looked  East,  when  there  were  still  enough  people  in  Malaysia  who 
remembered the Japanese occupation. Especially the Chinese, who lost the most people during 
the war. Still Japan had proved to be able to compete successfully against the West, both with 
military power as economic power. 
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These mixed images existed of  Japan.  Some believed that  the aid for  the South-East Asian 
countries was only for making profit for Japan as it provided aid where Japan could benefit  
most from it. As Hoong (1987) states that: 
“More  generally,  aid  has  been  criticized  as  too  immediately  connected  with  the  
furtherance of Japanese economic interests, the promotion of markets for exports, and 
the development of raw material for Japanese industry” (Hoong 1987:1104) 
For example focusing on infrastructure that would help the Japanese companies with easier  
shipping and accessibility. Likewise the focus on infrastructure could also be attributed to the 
fact that Japan had low natural resources, thus it was believed that they focused their aid on 
being able to better gain access to the natural resources they needed. Furthermore, the FDI 
from Japan was criticized just like its aid program, saying it was focusing on profits and not on 
contributing to reduce regional poverty or realizing the transfer of technology.  As mentioned 
by Denker (1994): 
“Many Japanese transnational corporations overprice sales to their subsidiaries situated 
in tax heavens and under price purchases from them to reduce tax liability” (Denker  
1994:65)
Japan realized the opportunity to gain more profits by locating their factories in areas where 
there were low labor costs, cheaply available resources and low prices for the building grounds.  
These factor were reason for Japan to increase its FDI greatly after the Second World War.  
Malaysia was not the only South-East Asian country that Japan traded with and many other 
ASEAN  countries  were  target  of  Japanese  exports  and  imports.  However,  Japan  was  for 
Malaysia their main import and export target in the mid-1970s. Aslam and Piei (1994) argue 
there was an unequal trade relation between Japan and Malaysia where Malaysian dependency 
was much higher than Japanese dependency on Malaysia. As said by Hoong: 
“The relationship, which has not changed much since the 1960s, is essentially typical of 
a  Third  World  country  and  a  developed  society,  in  which  the  former  supplies  the  
primary raw material while the latter exports the manufactured goods - an arrangement  
Malaysia is not too happy about” (Hoong 1987:1097). 
Aslam and Piei continue by saying that the small increase in exporting manufactured goods in 
the mid 1990s was largely due to the Japanese investment and not thanks to a increase in  
Malaysian manufacturers (Aslam and Piei 1994:25).
Before  Malaysia  became an NIC in the 2000s it  was  mainly  focused on manufacturing and 
exporting primary goods, with most focus on palm oil, tin and rubber. This was often easily  
exported to countries and therefore an almost unlimited source of income for Malaysia, but 
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these primary goods were however subjected to fluctuating prices. For Japan, Malaysia offered 
a very good option for FDI just like other developing countries. Cheap resources, labor and 
ground. For Malaysia Japan was their main export for most primary sources. Thus together with 
the Japanese aid program there was also a high increase in FDI from Japan to the South-East 
Asian countries. Mahathir believed that technology transfer from Japan would help create more 
manufacturing jobs for the Malays. Hopefully also resulting in more import substitution, which 
would lead to an increase in Malaysian manufactured goods. These products could then be 
exported so that Malaysia would be less reliant on the unstable prices of primary goods and 
could get a more reliable income from manufactured exports. 
Sogoshoshas and Japanese management
Besides  the  idea  of  technology  transfer  when  working  with  Japan,  there  were  also  other 
reasons for Mahathir to look east. Japan and Korea had both been very successful and this was 
often credited to the state-led companies. In Japan these were called the sogoshoshas, which 
literally translates to trading companies, but were often involved in many other sectors of the 
market as well. The reason why this was interesting for Mahathir was that he could manage 
these companies via the government and thus make sure his ideas would come through. As 
mentioned by Milne and Mauzey: 
“Mahathir is so interested in the completion of his favorite projects, and so doubtful  
that anyone else would pursue them as successfully  as himself,  that he seems non-
committal about giving up power” (Milne and Mauzy 1999:7)  
Furthermore, he was of course interested in the transfer of Japanese values to the Malays. In 
1980s  some  ideas  and  theories  existed  on  the  Japanese-style  management  These  mainly 
included; lifetime employment, promotion based on a seniority system, enterprise unions and 
the low status of women in the workplace. Lifetime employment was often seen to be the 
reason for the loyalty for the company and the hard work of every day. However, In the coming 
years after 1980 it was much disputed and in modern day Japan, this system is becoming more 
and more uncommon. According to Hirakubo (1999:43), Lifetime employment creates a sort of 
pseudo-loyalty. The problem with lifetime employment is that it discourages companies to lay 
off their workers, with even the government having made legal constraints against this and the 
Japanese tax system that favors the lifetime employment. Due to the difficulty of laying off  
employees, and the difficulty for employees to find a lifetime employment somewhere else 
(They prefer hiring people who are fresh from college) it becomes more and more a system that 
keeps unmotivated people in a company until they are up for pension. Therefor the image of  
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Japanese  as  hard-working  and  loyal  does  not  seem  to  be  that  trustworthy.  However,  the 
Japanese do work many hours a day and often stay in the office till  late. Smith (1994) also 
points out that the Japanese system will not be completely similar when put to use in Malaysia: 
“  ~in  ventures  owned  or  controlled  by  the  Japanese  in  Malaysia,  the  degree  of  
importation of this model of company organization will not be due to the mere fact of 
cultural contact, but will be dependent on the specific economic and political factors  
operating in Japan and Malaysia at the time” (Smith 1994:156) 
Just  like  Japan  differs  from  Malaysia,  so  does  Malaysia  differ  from  Japan.  The  Japanese 
managers that came to Japan to teach the Japanese style management also had to adapt to a  
Malaysian work environment. According to Smith (1994:157), the Japanese managers would 
promote their management style as  an ideal system and would show regret and indignation 
when Malays showed not to be as loyal or dedicated as the Japanese were, even though they 
provided less benefits for the Malays than that they would other Japanese. Even if the system 
did not prove to be ideal in Japan, the image that existed outside of Japan, as it did in Malaysia,  
was still keeping up the idea that it was. However these lifetime employments were usual in big  
companies,  like  the  sogoshoshas.  Otherwise,  smaller  companies  would  not  be  able  to  live 
through a financial crisis if they weren't able to lay off workers. For Malaysia, this was also 
slightly  problematic  as  Malaysia's  big  companies  were  still  not  as  large  as  the  Japanese 
sogoshoshas.  
Differences between Japan and Malaysia
Other problems with taking Japan as an example was the clear difference in ethnic division, 
cultural heritage and geographical location. It was very unlikely that Japan was able to be used 
for Malaysia as a role model with few similarities. Japan has an ethnic distribution of only 1.5% 
non-Japanese  citizens.  Japan  also  doesn't  have  much immigrant  workers  and  seems highly 
reluctant to do so.  It  also hasn't  been colonized and doesn't  have much primary resources 
either.  Therefore the economy, politics and society of Japan and Malaysia are far  from similar.  
Japan has also been known to be racist against its minorities, even going so far as to 'deny' the 
existence of  minorities (See Htun 2012).  The reason Japan is  able  to get  away with this  is  
because the minorities in Japan consist of such a small distribution of the total  population.  
Therefore it  is  unlikely and almost impossible that Japanese minorities would challenge the 
government. This is obviously not the case in Malaysia where the 'minorities' almost consist of 
half the population. 
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However, Japan was already a major economic factor in Malaysia so Mahathir's aim for Japan 
was not very far fetched. Japan was the main export and import target of Malaysia and in  
combination with its aid programs and interest in South-East Asia, it seemed logical to start up 
joint-ventures between Japan and Malaysia. However, Japan was interested in making profits 
and thus Mahathir's ideal of technology and value transfer was thus not Japan's main goal or 
interest. Eventually some of the projects led to negative thoughts on Japanese involvement as  
mentioned by Furuoka (2007): 
“The lack of success and negative publicity that accompanied a number of Malaysia-
Japan joint ventures combined with dashed hopes for cutting-edge technology spawned 
Malaysian  disillusionment  with  Japanese  multinationals,  even  within  the  Mahathir  
administration” (Furuoka 2007:516).
Japan's  relation with Malaysia was based on making profit,  thus it  seems a bit  idealistic to 
believe Japan was going to share its technological know-how with Malaysia simply because of  
amicable feelings. 
The “Look East” policy was believed to look East and not West, but Japan has some notable 
Western features. First of all, Japan's international policies followed the U.S. Very closely and 
was argued to be the reason Japan did not agree on becoming the leader of the EAEC. Thus  
even if Japan was seen as being able to compete against the West, after the war Japan was  
under heavy influence of the U.S. Furthermore, Japan's legal system was reformed after World 
War II to change to a more U.S. based system. Secondly and thirdly, Japan's education system is 
loosely based on the French system and Japan was the only country in the East to imitate the 
Western  behavior  by  colonizing  a  great  part  of  the  East.  It  is  logical  that  countries  are 
influenced by each other, but Japan can be argued to be a bit more Western than other Eastern  
countries. In this sense, it seems odd that China is not chosen to be an example if the policy  
would be to look East. A country that has been much more reluctant to take over Western 
values and is less easily influenced by the West. This means that Mahathir was not looking East 
to avoid the West,  or looking East to become more Eastern, but looking East to be able to 
compete to the West.
Mahathir wanted not only to look at Japan and Korea as economic,  but also had a cultural aim.  
Therefore certain projects were more difficult because Mahathir stressed the need to employ 
Malays, which were often under skilled workers in comparison with the Chinese and looked at 
Japan while it was unlikely that Malays would take over their values.
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Policies and projects stemming from the “Look East” policy
When the policy was initiated in 1981, Mahathir also promoted heavy industrialization and had 
already created the HICOM in 1980. Believing industrialization and urbanization was the key to 
development these policies were also formed with Mahathir's ideal in mind. The NEP needed 
there to be 30% Bumiputra entrepreneurship and as it had not been able to reach this goal,  
Mahathir saw the need for more industries that could provide for this opportunity.  
Sogoshoshas
The  “Look  East”  policy  supported  the  ideas  of  joint-ventures  with  either  Japan  or  Korea.  
However, the Steel-mill factory and the Proton project were both joint ventures with Japanese 
companies. Inspired by the Japanese sogoshoshas, Mahathir wanted to recreate the state-led 
enterprises starting with these two projects. According to Lim and Gomez (1994) there were at  
least three arguments for Malaysia to desire these sogoshoshas. 
Firstly, they would be good as trade intermediates and could spread the risks or could 
even start manufacturing products itself. Secondly, they would be good to open up new market  
possibilities, which would also help the export of primary goods. Finally, they would be good for  
counter-trade. These were also the arguments used by the Mahathir administration to promote 
the establishment of the Malaysian version of these  sogoshoshas and in the mid-1980s they 
started  constructing  such  companies.  In  Malaysia  these  were  referred  to  as  the  HICOM. 
However, according to Lim and Gomez, it hadn’t been very successful because it was rather  
impossible to emulate the Japanese sogoshoshas. 
Firstly, the sogoshoshas were dealing with much bigger numbers then it was possible for 
Malaysia at that time to generate. Secondly, these sogoshoshas were already in existence for a 
long time in Japan and thus were able to have a reliable image and tight network, that the 
Malaysian companies would not start with. Lastly, compared to the Japanese sogoshoshas that 
would benefit from overseas markets, for cheap labor etc., the Malaysian companies would not 
have this benefit due to their lower GDP.
Mahathir  thus neglected the great differences between Japan and Malaysia as was already 
criticized in the making of the “Look East” policy.  Japan was just  not fit  as an example for 
Malaysia as it did not share enough common ground. Therefore the reasons behind wanting to 
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emulate the sogoshoshas can be explained with different motives. Mahathir wanted companies 
that were state-led so he had a say in the matter. This was important for his goal to improve 
the job market for the Malays, so that he had more control in the private sector to secure 
employment  for  Malays.  Secondly  the  idea  that  these  sogoshoshas had  been  a  Japanese 
heritage,  could have given Mahathir  the idea that  these Malaysian  sogoshoshas eventually 
would  also  become  a  Malay  heritage.  This  would  inspire  nationalistic  thoughts  within  the 
Malays.  Thirdly,  Mahathir  wanted to  emulate  the Japanese  values,  so what  better  than to 
emulate Japanese companies.  Together with the joint-ventures, this would lead to a bigger 
exposure to the Japanese way of working and easier to attract Japanese managers willing to 
work in Malaysia.
The steel mill factory and the Proton project
Mahathir believed in these sogoshoshas and was greatly involved in the establishment of these 
Malaysian versions and had already created the HICOM in 1980 when he was minister for Trade 
and Industry. Thus when he was prime-minister he helped creating the steel-mill factory and 
the national car project. The steel-mill factory would lead to cheaper steel resources and thus 
less dependence on other  countries for  steel  export and indicate  a  higher development of  
Malaysia. The Proton project seemed unlikely to succeed as no other South-East Asian country 
during that time had managed to create a national car that had remained profitable, but would 
also  indicate  great  development  if  successful.  Both  projects  however,  were  to  be  fully 
dependable on Japanese technology and information. Believing that the local people working at  
the projects would eventually pick up on the technology and eventually be able to become 
independent from the Japanese. Therefore it was necessary to promote import substitution 
and production of local content. 
However back in 1981 when Mahathir choose these projects, he was still enthusiastic about  
these projects. It would not only be good for the industrial development of the country, but it 
would also create more job opportunities for the Malays and eventually lead to a bigger skilled 
labor force and import substitution. Thus giving the Malays the opportunity to increase their 
experience  in  the  work  field  and  promote  entrepreneurship.  The  choice  of  industries  by 
Mahathir however was evidence of the fact that he was trying to take away the Chinese control 
in these sectors.
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“Moreover, as local Chinese entrepreneurs dominated auto assembly, it was an obvious 
target for restructuring. Although, the state was already well represented in steel, there 
was a substantial Chinese presence in the industry” (Machado 1989:510) 
Even  though  this  might  have  been  an  'obvious'  target,  this  meant  that  the  Chinese  were 
discriminated against as it meant a great disadvantage for them. Not only did they have to 
compete against government sponsored industries, Malays would be given preferences in these 
new projects even if they lacked the certain skills necessary.  
“Ethnic preferences were clearly reflected in Proton's recruitment. In 1988, the plant  
employed  1,300  people,  94  per  cent  of  whom  were  ethnic  Malays.  Most  Proton  
personnel were inexperienced, while very few experienced workers laid off by the other 
assembly firms – mainly non-Malays - were hired” (Jomo 1994:285). 
With such a  high number  of  the workforce  for  the Proton project  to  be  bumiputra  it  was 
obvious there was positive discrimination. Further suggesting that the NEP and indirectly, the 
“Look  East”  policy  was  neglecting  other  ethnic  groups  from  being  supported  by  the 
government. 
The Malays that were to work at the Proton project were send to Japan to learn the Japanese 
work ethics and values, together with the technological know-how of the automobile industry. 
Sponsored by the government, they studied in Japan for a period of time, differing from the 
type  of  training  they  were  to  receive.  However,  the  focus  seemed  to  lie  on  learning  the 
language, history and society of Japan during their stay in Japan (Jomo 1994:286). Which was 
not  the  most  efficient  way  to  train  inexperienced  workers  into  successful  automobile 
manufacturers and when the Proton project was having problems, the Malay managers were 
blamed for their inadequacy. 
“In an unusually harsh  public  criticism  of  the  project's  managers,  Finance  Minister  
Datuk Paduka Daim Zainuddin told  the  press  in mid-1988,  "The  recession  is only  part  
of  the  problem.  If  a company  fails,  something  must  have gone wrong....  [I]n  
business  you  must  be  agile. .  .  . I am  prepared  to  listen [to  the  problems]  up to  a 
point.  Beyond  that,  I don't want  to  hear  any- more.  Either  you  perform  or  say  
goodby....  [I]f  [management  cannot show  results],  they  should  do what  people  in  
Japan do -  commit  harikiri [sic]” (Machado 1989:520).  
Not only blaming the managers, but also saying that they lack the Japanese mentality, where 
one should be shameful to have made a mistake. 
Another problem with these state-led projects and the high employment of Malays was 
of course that the money needed to come from either the government or from the aristocracy, 
which were mainly Chinese. If Mahathir did not allow for a Chinese owned company or even  
Chinese managers to be involved, the money from the Chinese would remain with the Chinese. 
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Mahathir  seemed a  bit  too  interested  in  keeping  the  Malays  and  the  Chinese  apart,  even 
though he wanted the Malays  to work in the same sector  as the Chinese.  Thus instead of  
promoting teamwork between the races, he opted for competition were one of the groups was 
sponsored  by the government. In the end, the Steel-mill factory eventually caused too much 
losses and was canceled. The Proton project is still in effect to this day, but it remains necessary 
to use heavy government subsidies to keep the project somewhat profitable. 
The education program
Not  only  trainings  in  Japan  were  sponsored  by  the  government,  but  also  regular  student 
exchange programs (Though there was high emphasis on the technical sector). Many students 
in  Malaysia  profited  from  the  “Look  East”  policy  program.  The  program  was  identified  as 
follows: 
 “The objective of this project  was  to  develop human resources  able to use  advanced 
technology and with Japanese work ethics by providing Malaysians with academic and 
training opportunities in Japan, thereby, in turn, contributing to the industrialization of 
Malaysia” (Kita 2011:2). 
After  30  years  of  the  “Look  East”  policy  a  number  of  14.000  Malaysian  students  have 
participated in the “Look East” policy. Which is still a rather small amount knowing Malaysia has 
a population of around 28 million. It means that only 0.0005% in 30 years has benefited directly  
from the policy. Still, having this program meant that Malaysia was showing the people the 
support the government was giving to people interested in looking at Japan.
 To assess the success of the education program, the Malaysian government had send 
out surveys to ex-students of the LEP (Look East policy) program and had conducted interviews 
with local and Japanese companies in Malaysia. 
 “Eighty  percent  of  employers  observed that  ex-students  of   the LEP Program have  
applied  Japanese  work  ethics  (“discipline,”  “an  appropriate  attitude  to  their  
assignments”  and  “punctuality/time  management”)  to  their  routine  work”  (Kita  
2011:7). 
Thus suggesting that the LEP program was effective in transferring Japanese values. However, 
work ethics such as a sense of shame and putting the group before the individual,  are not 
described and the amount of influence from the managers is left in the dark. There is also no 
information of an increase in work hours between non-LEP students and LEP students, which 
would also indicate transferred Japanese work ethics.
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 Furthermore, the ex-students that ended up in Japanese companies in Malaysia were 
often seen or used as translators, and or mediators between the Japanese and Malaysian staff. 
Many others received a job in the government, which would be less helpful in the technological 
development of Malaysia (Kita 2011:8). The problem with the goal of the program was that the 
amount of time studied in Japan, was not sufficient enough to take over the Japanese values. 
Especially  the  students  who  enroll  in  a  Japanese  university,  where  the  Japanese  work 
environment  is not simulated, will have a limited idea about Japanese work ethics and values.
There was also reason to prefer studying abroad, because before 1996 there was only a small  
amount of universities in Malaysia.  
“In 1995, 79,330 students were enrolled in degree courses at  domestic  universities  
while the number of students studying abroad reached 50,600. Of these about 40%  
were government-sponsored students and the rest was students studying at their own 
expense” (Kita 2011:3) 
However, in 1996 the Asian crisis put a hold on the increasing economy and less students went  
to study abroad in general. Thanks to the Education act in 1996 that allowed private institutions 
to give degrees, which was not possible before, Malaysia went from an amount of 7 national 
universities in 1990, up to 57 in 2009 (Kita 2011:4). Greatly increasing the domestic choice of  
universities.  Meaning  that  the  LEP  program  gained  increased  competition  from  domestic  
universities.  If  the  program  mainly  resulted  in  employment  in  Japanese  companies  as  a 
translator or mediator, the program offered not much diversity for future employment as an ex  
LEP student. Mahathir's cultural aim was thus not fully reached with the LEP program as it only 
directly offered a few people in Malaysia the chance to study or train at a Japanese university.  
Furthermore, the ex students did not necessarily gain the skills to be competitive against the 
Chinese or learned the work ethics and values of the Japanese that Mahathir focused on. 
The policies that Mahathir made in pare with the “Look East” policy were all possible to be used 
as direct or indirect transfer of Japanese values. The  sogoshoshas were state-led and offered 
Mahathir the opportunity to aim for a Malay heritage and competition against the Chinese in 
the private sector. This was evident in the state-led joint-venture projects; The Steel-mill and 
the Proton project.  Here,  the Malays  were favored as employees and managers.  However,  
when blamed for problems,  their lack of Japanese values was addressed. The education was 
the most direct approach to transfer these values, but was rather small in its operation. Though 
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the LEP-students were said to have gained Japanese work ethics, these did not address the  
sense of shame, group above individual and working more hours.
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Conclusion
Mahathir's Look East policy came into existence, because of his believe in the problems he laid 
out in the Malay Dilemma and The Challenge. Mahathir was looking for a way to change the 
values  of  the Malays,  which would allow them to be able  to compete with the successful  
Chinese. Mahathir stressed the need for a change of values and believed that Japanese values 
were  the  ones  the  Malays  should  aim  for.  When  the  “Look  East”  policy  was  initiated,  it  
remained vague  and  there  was  no real  document  available.  This  makes  it  difficult  to  fully 
understand the implication of the “Look East” policy and also to assert successes or failures of  
the policy.  However, it  was known that it  was looking to emulate the successful  countries, 
Japan and Korea. This meant a shift in international politics that did not aim at the traditional  
West, but at the East. However, more importantly, the policy intended to emulate the work 
ethics and values of those countries.  To realize this,  the government subsidized studying in 
Korea and Japan and sought joint-venture with those countries. Mahathir was also inspired by  
the Sogoshoshas, which were state-led enterprises, that could help Mahathir with reaching his 
goal. 
The believe that Japan was the best example to follow was because of the economic success 
Japan had enjoyed after the second world war. Mahathir  saw the reason for the economic  
success to lay within the work ethics and values of the Japanese. Believing that the Malays were 
lacking  the  motivation  and  nationalism  to  work  as  a  group  towards  the  development  of 
Malaysia and thus delaying the process.  However, taking Japan as an example for Malays to 
follow, was somewhat problematic. Japan shares few similarities with Malaysia and proved to 
be mainly involved with Malaysia for profitability. Thus the Japanese companies would not be 
focusing on a change of  values or technology transfer,  but more logically  on securing their 
profits. This left negative feelings with some of the Malaysians. 
Mahathir was very keen on making the Malays able to compete with the Chinese, but therefore 
made choices that were somewhat discriminatory against the Chinese. He preferred Malays in 
his  state-led  projects  and  caused  unequal  competition  against  the  Chinese  who  were  not 
enjoying government sponsorship. Furthermore, he chose to create projects in areas where the 
Chinese were most prominent and chose to increase his political aim towards the Islam. In a 
country where the Chinese consist of notable percentage, it is somewhat interesting that there 
have not been a repetition of the riots in 1969.  
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In conclusion, the Look East policy was not very effective in changing the Malays values into  
Japanese values simply by sending students to Japan or creating joint-venture with Japanese 
companies.  Though  it  can't  be  argued that  it  was  completely  unsuccessful,  the  amount  of  
students that underwent the LEP program was rather limited. The joint-ventures as well, did 
not prove to transfer the Japanese values of the managers to the Malaysian employees. There 
was however a change in direction from Western oriented politics, towards Eastern politics.  
Thus Malaysia did indeed look East thanks to the policy and has become a very successful  
South-East Asian country. 
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